How Intelligence Gaps Nearly Cost Trump His Life

This report addresses the extent to which gaps in Secret Service policy and practices contributed to security failures on July 13, 2024.

Authorized for Public Release by Chairman Grassley, the report to the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate Secret Service Gaps in Policy and Threat Information Sharing Hindered Efforts to Secure 2024 Trump Campaign Rally.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Secret Service operates under a "zero-fail" protection mission and is responsible for protecting the President, the Vice President, former Presidents, and others. However, on July 13, 2024, a gunman evaded Secret Service and law enforcement personnel. The gunman fired shots at then-former President Trump, injuring him and two rally participants, and killing a rally participant in the process.

This report addresses the extent to which gaps in Secret Service policy and practices contributed to security failures on July 13, 2024. GAO conducted site visits to the July 13, 2024, Trump Campaign rally site, Secret Service Headquarters, and multiple field offices. GAO reviewed Secret Service policies and investigative reports, extensive body camera footage, radio logs, and emails. GAO also obtained information from the Secret Service, including the protective detail for then-former President Trump, and federal, state, and local law enforcement.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making eight recommendations, including that the Secret Service develop a resource to provide agents with readily available information so they know what tasks to complete during protectee events, change policy to require threat information be proactively shared and implement a process that incorporates risk-based decisionmaking for resource allocation. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendations.

What GAO Found

The U.S. Secret Service failed to implement security measures that could have prevented the assassination attempt on then-former President Donald J. Trump during a July 13, 2024, campaign rally. At the time, then-former President Trump was not yet the official Republican nominee for President. This presented a unique challenge when Secret Service agents sought to determine what assets to deploy for the rally.

The failure was also caused in part by a lack of specific and complete guidance outlining roles and responsibilities for agents assigned to secure the rally. For example, Secret Service guidance did not include details outlining a list of key steps the site agent should take to properly staff the room, even though the Secret Service provides a checklist for personnel performing other specialized roles. Since the rally, the Secret Service has taken steps to revise its policies, but many of the policies still lack needed details.

Prior to the July 13 rally, senior-level Secret Service officials became aware of a threat to then-former President Trump. This information was not specific to the July 13 rally or gunman. Nonetheless, due to the Secret Service's siloed practice for sharing classified threat information, Secret Service and local law enforcement personnel central to developing site security plans for the rally were unaware of the threat.

According to Secret Service officials, this information was not more broadly shared across the Secret Service because in part, the information was highly classified, and the Intelligence Community did not include information at a lower classification level to share. However, the Secret Service's siloed information sharing practices, such as requesting that only personnel within an individual chain of command be briefed on threat information, contributed to members of the advance team not receiving relevant information.

Making changes to Secret Service policies to require it to proactively share threat information internally could help ensure its agents and partners will have information needed to provide effective protection. Further, sharing threat and risk information could also help ensure resource decisions are based on identified risks. Secret Service's resource allocation process is not currently set up to comprehensively consider all known risks. Implementing a process that does so can help ensure security asset decisions are based on need and not ad hoc actions outside of a formal process.

Timeline of When Secret Service Personnel Obtained But Did Not Share Threat

Information with Personnel Responsible for Site Security July 2024 Secret Service was made aware of classified threat information from the Intelligence Community and provided a briefing to select Secret Service senior executives.

The executives did not require that applicable personnel in the field who had responsibility for site security be provided with the threat information. Secret Service held a briefing on classified threat information for Donald Trump Protective Division senior officials, but not for others securing the site.

An official in the Donald Trump Protective Division shared general threat information with the lead advance agent. However, other members of the advance team responsible for site security did not receive the information.

(Timeline continues with days leading up to the July 13 rally, but specific details for these steps are not fully legible in the provided image. The sequence illustrates the progression of unshared information culminating in the rally.)